Mountain States Steel, INC. v. Voest-Alpine Services and Technologies Corporation: Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Mountain States Steel, INC. v. Voest-Alpine
Services and Technologies Corporation: Reply
Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Donald L. Dalton; Dalton, Kelley; Attorneys for Appellant.
Terry M. Plant, H. Justin Hitt; Plant, Wallace, Christensen, Kanell; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Mountain States Steel v. Voest-Alpine Services, No. 20000608.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/537
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
MOUNTAIN STATES STEEL, INC., Case No. 20000608-SC 
Third-Party Plaintiff, Priority No. 15 
vs. 
VOEST-ALPINE SERVICES & 
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF 
On Appeal from Judgment 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah 
Honorable James Taylor, Presiding 
Donald L. Dalton (4305) 
DALTON & KELLEY 
Post Office Box 58084 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158 
Telephone: (801) 583-2510 
Attorneys for Appellant Mountain 
States Steel, Inc. 
Terry M. Plant (2610) 
H. Justin Hitt (8762) 
PLANT, WALLACE, 
CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 363-7611 
Attorneys for 
Voest-Alpine Services & 
Technologies 
Appellee/Crosf-App'ellanT 
SEP 2 7 2001 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
— ^ 
si- pp ll t 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
MOUNTAIN STATES STEEL, INC., Case No. 20000608-SC 
Appellant/Third-Party Plaintiff, Priority No. 15 
vs. 
VOEST-ALPINE SERVICES & 
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, : 
Appellee/Third-Party Defendant. : 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
On Appeal from Judgment 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah 
Honorable James Taylor, Presiding 
Donald L. Dalton (4305) 
DALTON & KELLEY 
Post Office Box 58084 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158 
Telephone: (801)583-2510 
Terry M. Plant (2610) 
H. Justin Hitt (8762) 
PLANT, WALLACE, 
CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-
Appellant Voest-Alpine Services & 
Technologies Corporation 
Attorneys for Appellant/Cross-
Appellee Mountain States Steel, Inc. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENTS 1 
I. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR MODIFYING THE LEASE 
TERM OR DELAYING VOEST-ALPINE'S OBLIGATION 
TO PROVIDE LIABILITY INSURANCE 1 
II. THERE WAS NO WAIVER OF SUBROGATION WITHOUT 
NOTICE TO AND ENDORSEMENT FROM THE PARTIES' 
INSURERS 5 
III. IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ABSUED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO AWARD 
THE ADDITIONAL AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 13 
CONCLUSION 15 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
Cases 
Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) 12 
Continental Ins. Co. v. Boraie, 672 A.2d 274 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 
1995) 10 
Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 6 
1989) 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983) 5 
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990) 13 
Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998) 7 
IDS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1988) 9 
Millican of Wash. v. Wienker Carpet Service, 722 P.2d 861 
(Wash. App. 1986) 10 
Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193 (Utah 2000) 4 
Richmond Steel, Inc. v. Legal and General Assurance Society, 
Ltd., 821 F. Supp. 793 (D. P.R. 1993) 10,11 
Touchet Valley Grain Growers, Inc. v. Opp & Seibold General 
Construction, Inc., 831 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1992) 10 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) 4 
ii 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR MODIFYING THE LEASE TERM OR 
DELAYING VOEST-ALPINE'S OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE 
LIABILITY INSURANCE. 
Voest-Alpine admits that no provision of the Lease expressly provided 
for modification of the Lease term. (Pg. Voest-Alpine admits tha < 
provision of the Lease expressly provid- * -1 .a> ing its obligati i cr 
the Lease, except the payment of rent. {Id.) As a result, Voest-Alpine admits 
that no provision of the Lease expressly provided for delaying its obligation to 
provide liability insurance. (Pg. 17) This should have ended the inquiry since 
Voest-Alpine admits that the foregoing Lease provisions are "clear." (Pg. 17) 
However, Voest-Alpine invites the Court to read beyond the express 
language of the agreement because it "produces an itici (tiitablr lesui! n Pg. 
19) Voest-Alpine argues that "[t]here is no justifiable basis for finding that 
Voest-Alpine was obligated to procure a bodily injury and property damage 
liability insurance policy covering Mountain States and Mountain States' 
building where Mountain States failed to deliver possession of the building." 
(id.) 
The first problem is that no provision of the Lease required Voest-
Alpine "to procure a...property damage liability insurance policy 
covering...Mountain States' building...." (Pg. 19) The obligation for real 
property insurance lay with Mountain States. (R. 314, ^[6.2(a)) Voest-
Alpine's obligation for property insurance was limited to its own "personal 
or other property to be located on or about the premises...." {Id. at ^f6.2(b)) 
It is clear that Voest-Alpine is speaking only of its obligation to provide 
liability insurance. {Id. at f 6.1) 
To answer Voest-Alpine's question about that insurance, it made 
perfect sense to require liability insurance at the start of the Lease term even 
if possession were delivered later. At the time the Lease term commenced, 
Voest-Alpine was on the property working on its lessee improvements. (R. 
252/4-12) It may be also that Voest-Alpine was working on its 
commitments to Geneva Steel. (R. 252/13-22) It is certain that Voest-Alpine 
was assisting Mountain States' with its lessor improvements. (R. 250/5-25) 
Voest-Alpine's presence on the leased premises increased the risk of injury 
and justified the procurement of liability insurance even though possession 
was not formally delivered until later. 
Despite what it said about the Lease provisions being "clear," Voest-
Alpine invites the Court to consider whether the Lease provisions are "vague 
and ambiguous." (Pg. 18 n.2) This is based on the deposition testimony of 
2 
Mountain States' Chris Olsen. (R. 290) Mr. Olsen offered his "opinion" that 
the Lease term was extended by Mountain States' failure to complete tenant 
improvements. (R. 229/8-12) However, as recognized by counsel for both 
parties, Mr. Olsen's testimony was nothing more than a "legal conclusion." 
(R. 229/2-4) Mr. Olsen's deposition testimony could not create an ambiguity 
that did not otherwise exist in the contract language. 
Voest-Alpine claimed (at one time) that the liability insurance provision 
did not apply because the accident did not arise out of its "ownership, use, 
occupancy or maintenance of the premises." (Pg. 5, f6) Voest-Alpine wisely 
dropped this argument since the cited provision is not limited to Voest-
Alpine's "ownership, use, occupancy or maintenance." (R. 314, 16.1) In fact, 
it says nothing about whose ownership, use, occupancy or maintenance is at 
issue. It clearly speaks of "any liability arising out of the ownership, use, 
occupancy or maintenance of the premises...." There is no question that the 
accident arose out of someone's "ownership, use, occupancy, or maintenance 
of the premises...." That is enough for the provisions of f6.1 to apply. 
At one time, Voest-Alpine also raised the insurance provision in the 
"Work Letter," Exhibit "C" to the Lease. (Pg. 6, [^6) Voest-Alpine wisely 
dropped this argument because the cited provision is perfectly consistent with 
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the liability insurance provision of |6 .1 . In |^5 of the Work Letter, (R. 298) 
Voest-Alpine was required to obtain certain insurance, including 
"Comprehensive General Liability Insurance...during the continuance of any 
of Lessee's Improvements within the Premises." There is nothing in [^5 
providing that this Comprehensive General Liability Insurance was a 
substitute for the liability insurance required by ^|6.1. In fact, it appears that 
the liability insurance required by f6.1 would have satisfied Voest-Alpine's 
obligation in J^5 of the Work Letter. Both provisions are therefore perfectly 
complimentary. 
Mountain States could not disagree more with Voest-Alpine's statement 
of contract interpretation. (Pg. 20) Voest-Alpine cites a case about 
"postnuptial agreements" where the agreement in question could not be 
located, and one of the parties was deceased. Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193 
f 3 (Utah 2000). There is an important distinction, which Voest-Alpine 
failed to mention, between postnuptial agreements and "commercial 
contracts." Id. at f 20. 
In the end, Voest-Alpine's authority is not truly apposite. It merely 
restates the rule stated by the Court in Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 
104 (Utah 1991): "A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of 
4 
more than one reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of 
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." 813 P.2d at 108 (quoting 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983)). 
All of which stands for the proposition that courts should not consider 
the "fairness" of a written agreement in the absence of an ambiguity. Voest-
Alpine concedes that the Lease provisions are clear. There is nothing more to 
do than sustain the decision of the district court that Voest-Alpine was 
obligated, by the clear and unambiguous terms of the Lease, to provide 
Mountain States with liability insurance upon the commencement of the Lease 
term. 
II. THERE WAS NO WAIVER OF SUBROGATION WITHOUT 
NOTICE TO AND ENDORSEMENT FROM THE PARTIES' 
INSURERS. 
Mountain States' position on the "Waiver of Subrogation" is simple. If 
the first sentence of [^6.4 accomplished a waiver of subrogation, as Voest-
Alpine contends, (pp. 23-24) there was no need for the second sentence 
requiring notice to and endorsement from the parties' insurers. If notice and 
endorsement were required for "the insurance policies required [by the 
Lease]," it was required for "any" insurance the parties might have if it was 
going to form the basis for a waiver of subrogation. 
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Once again, it does not appear that the parties intended a waiver of 
subrogation by the first sentence of ^6.4. It is certain that the first sentence 
accomplished a waiver of "rights of recovery"' between the parties, which 
included their "officers, employees, agents and representatives." However, 
the first sentence says nothing about the parties' "insurers." 
Voest-Alpine seems to concede that a waiver of subrogation cannot be 
effected without the parties' insurers. (Pp. 23-24) Voest-Alpine claims that 
"insurers" was implied because of the rules of equitable subrogation. E.g., 
Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah App. 
1989). However, that only speaks to the application of equitable subrogation 
to the parties' agreement, not to whether the parties intended the rules of 
equitable subrogation as part of their agreement. No one questions that the 
parties were free to craft their own agreement, no matter the rules of 
equitable subrogation. 
Voest-Alpine knows that it must address the second sentence of TJ6.4. 
It does so by limiting its application to the "the policies of insurance 
required [by the Lease]." (Pp. 25-26) However, even if that were the proper 
interpretation, it does not answer the question: Why would the parties 
require notice and endorsement for some insurance policies and not others? 
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Voest-Alpine has no explanation. It lamely asserts that "it was possible 
that the parties would need to obtain additional insurance to meet the lease 
requirements." (Pg. 26) That may be true, but it does not explain why notice 
and endorsement were required for the "additional insurance" required by the 
Lease and not for other insurance the parties might have irrespective of their 
Lease obligations. 
There must be some reason for the notice and endorsement requirement 
even if that requirement were limited to "the policies of insurance required [by 
the Lease]." Strangely enough, Voest-Alpine supplies the very reason: 
"Voest-Alpine desired that Mountain States inform its insurers of the waiver 
to preclude Mountain States' insurers from bringing an action against Voest-
Alpine....Mountain States and Voest-Alpine sought to make certain that they 
would not be bothered by insurer-driven subrogation actions." (Pp. 29-30) 
This is an acknowledgement that waiver cannot be accomplished 
without a "knowing relinquishment of a known right." Jenkins v. Percival, 
962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998). It is also an acknowledgement that the first 
sentence of f 6.4 does not accomplish a waiver of subrogation. Otherwise, 
there would be no need to inform Mountain States' insurers, in any case, that 
they were "precludefd] from bringing an action against Voest-Alpine." 
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Given that, it may be that the parties did not intend to limit the 
application of the notice and endorsement requirement to the insurance 
required by the Lease. The language of the second sentence says that "upon 
obtaining the policies of insurance required hereunder, [the parties shall] 
give notice to the insurance carrier or carriers...." There is nothing 
indicating that "insurance carrier or carriers" is limited to "the insurance 
carrier or carriers providing the policies of insurance required hereunder." 
That is certainly one possible interpretation, but not the only one. 
Fortunately, there is a way out of this linguistic conundrum. The Court 
may interpret f6.4 in a manner that is consistent with all of its stated 
language to provide that notice and endorsement were required in the case of 
any insurance acquired by the parties, whether or not it was required by the 
Lease. This would give effect to the waiver in the first sentence and 
harmonize it with the notice and endorsement requirement in the second 
sentence. 
Otherwise, the Court is left to interpret [^6.4 so that the waiver of 
subrogation applies only to "the policies of insurance required [by the 
Lease]." In such a case, the waiver in the first sentence would remain intact, 
but it would not apply to the parties' insurers except in the case of "the 
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policies of insurance required [by the Lease]" where there was notice to and 
endorsement from those insurers. 
Admittedly, this is not the best interpretation, but it is the only other one 
that gives effect to and harmonizes the waiver in the first sentence with the 
notice and endorsement requirement in the second sentence. LDS Hospital v. 
Capitol Life Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). 
One way or the other, TJ6.4 cannot be interpreted in the manner 
contended by Voest-Alpine. According to Voest-Alpine, there was an 
unconditional waiver of subrogation for insurance not required by the Lease, 
but not for insurance required by the Lease. It makes no sense that the parties 
would condition waiver of subrogation for the very insurance required by the 
Lease, but not for other insurance upon which they might base a waiver of 
subrogation. 
This would permit suits by the insurers most likely to indemnify the 
parties for loss under the Lease, which would defeat the purpose behind the 
waiver of subrogation and cannot be what the parties intended. 
Since there is no indication that the parties were thinking about "rules" 
of equitable subrogation when they made the waiver in the first sentence, it 
makes sense that they intended for notice and endorsement to be required in 
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all cases. The only other conclusion is that the parties were thinking about 
insurance required by the Lease, since the Lease does not mention insurance 
not required by the Lease.1 
The legal authority cited by the parties does not help. That is because 
the circumstances and waivers were different in every case. For instance, 
Touchet Valley Grain v. Opp. & Seibold, 831 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1992), the 
parties' agreement expressly provided for waiver of "[s]ubrogation rights." 
831 P.2d at 726. The same was true in Continental Ins. Co. v. Boraie, 672 
A.2d 274, 275 (NJ. Super. Law Div. 1995). That was not true in this case. 
It may be a small point, but Richmond Steel, Inc. v. Legal & General 
Assurance Soc, Ltd., 821 F. Supp. 793 (D. P.R. 1993) does not stand for the 
proposition that waivers have been enforced "even though the insurers were 
not informed of the waiver." (Pg. 31) The court did not address this issue, 
and there is no way to know if that was the case. 821 F. Supp. at 799-802. 
The same is true for Millican of Wash. v. Wienker Carpet Service, 722 
P.2d 861 (Wash. App. 1986). The court ruled that a waiver of subrogation 
was enforceable because, according to its own language, it did not 
"prejudice the insurance afforded by such policies." That may be because 
1
 Other than, possibly, the word "any" in the first sentence. 
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the insurers swiv notified of the pm\ ISMVM I lov\ewi , il is impossible to say. 
For these reasons, this case should be decided based on the circumstances of 
these parties and the language of their agreement. 
We can state with assurance that Voest-Alpine is serving up a recipe for 
disaster when it seeks to place "the burden on insurers to protect their 
subrogation rights by including pioliihihons a^aaist iiiiii lateral subtotal a MI 
wahcrs in 'hen IIIMII.HH. p»liuH, " (Pg. *2l 
Insurers are sure to do just that, but insureds are no more likely to read 
those provisions than they are other insurance provisions. This will provide 
insurers an opportunity to deny coverage, which will defeat the purpose 
behind waivers of subrogation, which is to provide parties to a contract with 
insurance to cover their risks. Rit iw a a u / Stt "< >/. siq, >/ < i, 821 F Si lpp at 800. •.• 
11"haI is nn»l sound poliev. 
It is interesting that Voest-Alpine would say: "If notice and 
endorsements were required, either party could unilaterally destroy the waiver 
simply by failing to inform its insurers of the provision or by failing to obtain 
the endorsement." (Pg. 30) 
As we said before, enforcing ihu wan er iii tins i ase 
\ ' oest- \lj:)ii lie to a\ oid its obligatioi i lo pro* ale liiahiillil; air1" * ' ' -e 
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again defeats the purpose behind waivers of subrogation. Besides, the 
solution to Voest-Alpine's problem is quite simple. Parties could demand to 
see the insurer endorsements. If Voest-Alpine had done that in this case, it 
would have known that the waiver was not enforceable. 
Mountain States is in perfect agreement with the citation of Allstate v. 
Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1202 (Utah 1980): The purpose of subrogation "is to 
work out an equitable adjustment between the parties by securing the 
ultimate discharge of a debt by the person who, in equity and in good 
conscience ought to pay it." 
Mountain States' insurers surely bargained for a premium to pay a 
loss, but they would not have paid the loss if Voest-Alpine had satisfied its 
indemnity insurance obligation. When Voest-Alpine denied the tender of 
defense, Mountain States' insurers had no choice but to pay the loss. 
Therefore, according to Voest-Alpine, they should be denied a recovery 
since they paid a loss, which they were legally contracted to do, when Voest-
Alpine failed to provide the insurance for which it was legally contracted. 
There is no fairness in that. 
2
 Since their insurance was not conditioned on the absence of a waiver of subrogation in the Lease. 
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III. IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO AWARD THE 
ADDITIONAL AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Voest-Alpine explained to the trial court the "arithmetic error" that 
accounted for the omission of $8,173.55 in attorney's fees from the Judgment 
for Attorney's Fees. (R. 1139) It submitted a Seconu t.« T. 
P l an t s . "- ' • 
Objections, i 7-11 
Voest-Alpine explained that the actual amount of attorney's fees billed 
by its Salt Lake City law firm were $38,380.00. (R. 1071, ff) Voest-Alpine 
explained that this was supported by all of the bills from Voest-Alpine's Salt 
Lake City law firm. (R. 1069) There is every indication that the trial court 
considered this mformalmn bofoiv (.iitcimy, .ludj.'iiu'iil 
Vocsl Mpnii' ''onli ml1 lli.M lhc 1ml i our' abused its discretion by 
refusing to award one-hundred percent of the billed amount from its Salt Lake 
City law firm. (Pg. 36) However, Voest-Alpine's legal authority stands 
contrary: "A court need not award the entire amount requested, but must 
evaluate the requested fees to determine if a lesser amount is reasonable under 
the circumstances." Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 220 (Utah App. 1990). 
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There is no indication that the trial court rejected the higher amount 
simply because some part of it was left out of the original calculation. 
Instead, there is every indication that the trial court agreed with Voest-
Alpine that $30,206.45 was a reasonable attorney's fee no matter how much 
Voest-Alpine was billed by its Salt Lake City law firm. 
Admittedly, this does not appear in the record. All we have is the trial 
court's handwritten interlineation of the Judgment prepared by Voest-
Alpine. (R. 1133) If a remand is warranted, it should be for the trial court to 
state its reasons for refusing the higher amount. 
There is no basis to enter judgment for the entire amount requested by 
Voest-Alpine. Mountain States objected to the higher amount (R. 1135) 
because Voest-Alpine made it extremely difficult to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the extra amount after the initial representation that 
$30,206.45 was reasonable. 
This Court would have to review all of Voest-Alpine's attorney bills 
to confirm that $38,300.00, not $30,206.45, is the proper amount. The better 
course, if the trial court's Judgment for Voest-Alpine (R. 955) is not 
reversed, is to remand to the trial court for further determination. 
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CONCLUSION 
Voest/ \ 1] )ii le I: w is conceded that the Lease was "clear" on the beginning of 
the Lease term and its obligation to provide liability insurance. That should end 
the inquiry. However, it was not "unfair" to require Voest-Alpine to provide 
liability insurance at the beginning of the Lease term when its employees were on 
the premises working on tenant improvements 
consideration when \hv npxTinvnl is dear. 
It * ii clear that the first sentence of f 6.4 provided for a waiver of 
subrogation. It says nothing about "subrogation" or "insurers." All it says is that 
Mountain States waived claims against Voest-Alpine, its "officers, employees, 
agents and representatives." 
If there were no second sentence, tf le Con n I: c 01 ilci pi obabl> coi iclude tl lat 
Mountain ^ ile^"' in^mvi'; \\av htnvd Irom h'iiigiiifi I'him k.v;nise ol 1 hr );m of 
equitable subrogation. However, it is clear from the second sentence that notice to 
and endorsement from the parties' insurers was necessary to effect a waiver of 
subrogation, even if only for the insurance required by the Lease, whatever the law 
of equitable subrogation. 
There is no basis on wl i n; 11 ui I{IMIII<.'UISII I In; IMMIIIUICC lequneil In iln; 1 ease 
.mini Iht" inviiiihtnu1 upon w hirh Voest Alpine hiises Us ninini ol \vni\iM ol 
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subrogation. It makes no sense that the parties would condition the waiver 
of subrogation in the very case where loss would be indemnified under the 
Lease. That being the case, the Court must look for a way to harmonize the 
notice and endorsement requirement with the waiver. 
The only way to do that is construe f 6.4 to require notice to and 
endorsement from "any" parties' insurer, which, as Voest-Alpine concedes, 
is the only sure way to secure a waiver of subrogation. Otherwise, the Court 
must construe |^6.4 as applying only to the insurance required by the Lease 
in order to harmonize all of the provisions of 1f6.4 and to secure the benefits 
of waivers of subrogation in this and other cases. 
Finally, at the very most, the Court should remand the matter of 
attorney's fees to the trial court for further determination. There is no basis 
on which to enter judgment for the higher amount requested by Voest-
Alpine. 
For the foregoing additional reasons, Mountain States respectfully 
requests that the Judgment of the trial court (R. 955) be REVERSED. 
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